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Abstract  
This article examines how labour market vulnerability and social policy interact to shape 
generalised trust. Building from the literature on dualisation, I suggest that: (1) labour market 
outsiders will have lower levels of generalised trust due to their increased risk exposure; and (2) 
active labour market policies, by conditioning labour market vulnerability, can mitigate the 
impact of outsiderness on trust. The study thus leverages within-country differences between 
insiders and outsiders, in the process mitigating some of the confounding issues that afflict the 
existing trust literature. Analysis of data from the 2008-2014 waves of the European Social 
Survey then provides evidence of both the impact of outsiderness on trust and the ability of 
social policy to moderate that effect. The investigation sheds light on an additional consequence 
of dualisation while also highlighting the potential influence of social policy (holding the broader 
culture constant) on generalised trust.  
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Labour market dualisation has been shown to have a wide array of negative consequences: 
outsiders are subject to frequent job loss, poorer working conditions and, in many instances, 
reduced access to the welfare state (e.g. D'Addio and Rosholm, 2005; Gash and McGinnity, 
2007; Palier and Martin, 2007). This paper explores whether a lower level of social trust should 
be added to the list.  
Focussing on the insider-outsider divide also allows us to gain insights into the ways in which 
institutions impact social trust. Although research broadly supports the claim that generous 
welfare states are associated with higher levels of generalised trust (e.g. Larsen, 2007; Gelissen 
et al., 2012), there is continued debate as to the mechanisms driving that relationship (cf. 
Uslaner, 2008; Nannestad et al., 2014). It is here that the literature on dualisation can be 
instructive: outsiderness is associated with a variety of consequences that, on the one hand are 
correlated with lower trust, but on the other might be mitigated by social policy. Leveraging 
intra-country insider-outsider cleavages thus permits us to assess the mechanism behind the 
welfare state’s generation of trust, while at the same time holding cultural context and broader 
trust levels constant. What is more, this approach also allows us to draw out implications about 
how labour market institutions might matter for social trust.  
In order to carry out this analysis, the first step is to focus on labour market vulnerability per se 
(i.e. “outsiderness”), rather than related concepts such as class, skill-set, or even employment 
status at a given moment. Importantly, this requires us to consider country-level patterns in 
labour markets, given the impact of labour market regulations and economic factors on risk 
exposure. While more involved, this approach permits a more direct investigation of how the risk 
of unemployment and atypical employment impact generalised trust, controlling for related 
factors such as income, education, and current employment status.  
Establishing that labour market vulnerability negatively impacts trust then allows us to examine 
whether welfare states can mitigate that effect. There are two reasons to think that active labour 
market policies in particular should matter. First, insofar as these programmes protect outsiders 
and reduce social exclusion (see Anderson and Pontusson, 2007), they should mitigate risk 
among the vulnerable and its ensuing negative effects on trust. Second, these policies can also 
erode the insulation of insiders from labour market risk (see Rueda, 2014, pp. 388-389), in the 
 
 
process further levelling out trust across the insider-outsider spectrum. The difference in the 
trust-levels of insiders and outsiders should therefore vary with welfare state design.  
This article begins by laying out the relevant literature and its implications for the relationship 
between trust, labour market vulnerability, and the welfare state. It then applies the continuous 
insider-outsider measure developed by Schwander and Häusermann (2013) to the 2008, 2010, 
2012, and 2014 waves of the European Social Survey, incorporating data from 16 Western 
European countries. The findings suggest that social policy can indeed impact trust-levels: 
outsiderness is associated with lower trust, but active labour market policy expenditure seems to 
mitigate the size of that effect. The study thus sheds light on both an additional consequence of 
dualisation and the potential influence of social policy on generalised trust.  
 
Trust, risk, and the welfare state 
Research on trust suggests that more generous welfare states are broadly associated with higher 
levels of social trust (e.g. Gelissen et al., 2012), although the direction of the causal arrow 
remains under debate (c.f. Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011; Brewer et al., 2014). There is a 
consensus, however, that welfare states are not all created equal: social policy programmes may 
either produce or destroy social capital, depending on their design.  
In particular, much has been made of the distinction between universal and means-tested benefits 
(e.g. Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005). By leaving room for partiality, means-tested benefits open up 
more space for perceptions of corruption and cheating (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008); these 
programmes also have a much poorer record in reducing inequality, which could negatively 
impact trust by deceasing optimism and shared values and increasing social distance between 
classes (Uslaner, 2003; Larsen, 2007). Conversely, universal programmes might increase trust by 
enhancing equality, optimism, and the perception of individual opportunity (Uslaner, 2002). 
Yet it seems likely that different segments of society experience these sorts of effects in different 
ways. This variation is most apparent in discussions of immigrant groups, as they have both 
distinct cultural backgrounds and different experiences from “natives” within their destination 
countries (e.g. Dinesen, 2012). But this dynamic should also apply to the division between 
 
 
insiders and outsiders, given their different experiences of both labour market vulnerability and 
the welfare state.  
Here the work of Lee (2013) serves as our starting point: seeking to explain the high levels of 
generalised trust in Nordic welfare states, he stresses the importance of active labour market 
policy (ALMP) and high public investment in skill provision. Lee argues that these policies are 
key to increasing social trust, since they combine generous benefits with monitoring and better 
allow workers to manage life chances and risks. He suggests that the weak labour market 
position of manual and agricultural workers make them particularly prone to low trust – save for 
where social policy reduces their vulnerability (Lee, 2013, p. 609).  
Yet this argument can be further refined and explored by incorporating a nuanced understanding 
of insider-outsider distinctions. Specifically, exposure to risk and the ability to use the welfare 
state to manage that risk vary according to more than just skill-level. This is the case due to both 
labour market regulations and the relationship between non-standard employment histories and 
benefit access and generosity (delineated below).1  
This focus on the interaction between labour market vulnerability, welfare state access, and risk 
suggests that the literature on dualisation can be especially valuable. Work on labour market 
dualisation highlights the divide between a primary sector characterised by higher quality 
employment and a secondary sector of lower pay, temporary contracts, and part-time work 
(Berger and Piore, 1980). While this secondary sector of atypical, nonstandard employment was 
originally rather small, it has grown substantially in recent decades, especially for women, youth, 
and immigrants (e.g. Gash and McGinnity, 2007).  
It is important to note that within this paradigm, labour market vulnerability and education- or 
skill-levels do not necessarily overlap (see Häusermann et al., 2014). Older manual workers in 
Continental and Southern Europe, for example, may well be less at risk of unemployment or 
atypical employment than younger, more educated individuals. As a result, rather than treating 
all labour markets as if they share a common distribution of risk, we should consider the 
interplay of diverse labour market and social policy contexts.  
There are three key trust-related features of dualisation to consider. First, outsiders are likely to 
experience repeated bouts of unemployment, as they go from one nonstandard job to another 
 
 
(e.g. Gash and McGinnity, 2007). This pattern has clear potential implications for social trust: 
job loss is associated with a number of negative knock-on effects that have been tied to lower 
social trust, such as loss of economic and social status, shrinking social networks, worsened 
psychological well-being, and reduced optimism (e.g. Carroll, 2007; Putnam, 2000). And 
importantly, previous research suggests that the consequent impact of unemployment on trust 
persists well after re-employment (Laurence, 2005). 
Second, outsiderness is not just potentially problematic because of its connection to more 
frequent stints of unemployment; even during employment, it is correlated with problems such as 
decreased perceptions of fairness and increased social exclusion (e.g. Anderson, 2009; D'Addio 
and Rosholm, 2005). Given that these sorts of outcomes are themselves associated with lower 
levels of trust (e.g. Dinesen, 2012; Uslaner, 2002; Putnam, 2000), one would also expect 
employed outsiders to be negatively affected by their labour market vulnerability.  
Third, and most centrally for present purposes, outsiders often have a far weaker welfare safety 
net to rely upon, since access to generous unemployment benefits typically depends on a 
standard employment history. In the most egregious of cases, labour market regulations further 
worsen this inequality by providing strong protections for some while leaving others vulnerable 
(e.g. Palier and Martin, 2007; Häusermann and Schwander, 2010). Note that these unequal 
protections should matter for several reasons that transcend the employed/unemployed divide. 
Most obviously, access to more generous welfare state benefits should shape both the perceived 
costs of unemployment (for the employed) and the actual experience of job loss (for the 
unemployed). At the same time, just as economic inequality appears to impact trust by shaping 
pessimism and anxiety (Wright, 2014), so too might perceptions of unequal opportunities and 
protections. Finally, exclusion from the generous benefits that might otherwise engender greater 
trust could also play a role, and may even lead individuals to feel cheated by the system.  
Research on dualisation thus highlights that labour market vulnerability can, over time, have 
profound effects on both one’s exposure to negative, trust-related outcomes and one’s access to 
the welfare state. When combined with the argument that high vulnerability negatively affects 
generalised trust by increasing (among other things) pessimism and social exclusion, we arrive at 
Hypothesis 1: that greater outsiderness (ceteris paribus) will lead to a lower level of generalised 
trust. Importantly, long-term experiences of labour market vulnerability are expected to have an 
 
 
impact on trust that is independent of related factors, such as education, income, and even current 
employment status. This means, for example, that in light of their employment histories and 
perceived positions in the labour market, two unemployed persons with vastly different degrees 
of outsiderness are expected to: (1) exhibit divergent levels of optimism and social exclusion; (2) 
draw upon very different welfare state benefits; and (3) consequently have distinct levels of 
social trust.  
Insofar as social policy design is able to counteract some of the consequences of outsiderness 
that are associated with lower trust, the welfare state should also play a role. In particular, ALMP 
expenditure, which includes spending on programmes such as job training, vocational 
rehabilitation, and recruitment incentives for employers, is likely to have an important impact 
(see Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). As previous research has demonstrated, these types of 
policies have clear implications for the labour market vulnerability of outsiders. While this is 
most obviously true for outsiders with lower levels of education, research suggests that the effect 
may extend more broadly, as ALMP expenditure has been shown to generally increase outsiders’ 
perceptions of social mobility and inclusion (cf. Anderson, 2009; Sage, 2015). What is more, 
ALMP expenditure likely also shapes the vulnerability of insiders, since as more outsiders are 
brought into standard employment, insiders find their bargaining position progressively 
weakened (see Rueda, 2014, pp. 388-389).  
Taken together, these points lead us to Hypothesis 2: that (ceteris paribus) the negative effect of 
outsiderness on generalised trust will be mitigated by social programmes (namely, ALMP) aimed 
at reducing outsider vulnerability. In other words, the greater the amount of ALMP expenditure, 
the more similar the trust levels of insiders and outsiders.  
Overall, this reasoning suggests that if welfare states impact individual-level trust by mitigating 
risk and related negative outcomes, we should find (1) that differences exist in trust-levels across 
insiders and outsiders, and (2) that the size of these differences should vary by welfare state 
design, with ALMP expenditure likely to have an effect. By leveraging within-country 
cleavages, this approach allows us to explore the relationship between the welfare state and 
generalised trust in more detail.  
 
 
 
Data 
The analysis is based upon survey data from the 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 waves of the 
European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is ideal for this study since it includes the standard 
generalised trust questions as well as fine-grained occupational data (using International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) codes). The latter are required for the use of an 
occupation-specific approach to measuring risk of unemployment and atypical employment (see 
below for further discussion). The investigation is restricted to the four most recent waves since 
the others lack a standardised income measure (a central control given the role of vulnerability) 
and in a number of cases also suffer from issues related to occupational and educational 
classifications. (Note that although the 2012 and 2014 waves employ a substantially altered 
ISCO coding, the categorisations are converted to align with the earlier scheme.2) 
The study focusses upon the 16 West European cases included in any of these survey waves.3 
The Eastern European cases are excluded for two reasons: first, past research suggests that 
Eastern and Western European respondents interpret survey questions gaging generalised trust in 
fundamentally different ways (e.g. Badescu, 2003; Delhey et al., 2011); second, Eastern Europe 
is marked simultaneously by large informal economies and by extensive informal welfare 
systems that complement and (often) replace government benefits (e.g. Kuitto, 2016: Polese et 
al, 2014; Schneider et al., 2010).  
Online Appendix Table 1 (OA1) lists the number of observations in each case, as well as the 
wave years. After excluding observations with missing data we are left with 77099 observations, 
with a minimum of 440 respondents per country-wave (in Italy) and a maximum of 2230 (in 
Germany).  
 
Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable in the analysis is individual-level generalised trust. To that end, the study 
employs the standard approach in the literature (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2009; Sønderskov, 2011), 
performing factor analysis on three trust-related questions in the ESS to generate a single index.4 
The three questions assess expectations about trustworthiness, helpfulness, and fairness, and are 
respectively worded as follows: ‘generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
 
 
trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’; ‘would you say that most of the 
time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?’; and ‘do you 
think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they 
try to be fair?’. Response categories range from zero to ten. Taken together, the questions load 
onto a single factor, and the resulting index ranges from -2.47 to 2.00, with a (weighted) mean of 
-.054.  
Although this approach is widely used, there is some debate as to whether these survey questions 
can accurately assess general trust. Respondents may well think of members of their community 
or cultural group when asked about ‘most people’ (see Nannestad, 2008, pp. 417-418). 
Importantly, however, the measure does show stability over time (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008) 
and also has a strong relationship to other measures (Bjørnskov, 2007). And while this approach 
may pose issues across very distinct countries and cultural groups (Nannestad, 2008, p. 417), 
Delhey et al. (2011) find that in the Western world, the extent of the imagined trust circle 
prompted by questions about ‘most people’ is quite large. Given the present focus on Western 
Europe, the impact of these issues on our investigation should therefore be relatively 
circumscribed.  
 
Independent variables 
The key explanatory variable is degree of outsiderness, i.e. exposure to the risk of atypical 
employment and unemployment, which is subsequently interacted with ALMP expenditure (as a 
percentage of GDP) in the full model.  
In analysing outsiderness, the goal here is to move beyond past research on trust by focusing 
more expressly on labour market vulnerability. The traditional approach to categorising insiders 
and outsiders would be to create a dummy variable using solely the employment status of the 
respondent at the time of the survey; unemployed respondents and those in involuntary part-time 
or fixed-term jobs would then be coded as outsiders, while those in full-time permanent 
employment are coded insiders (e.g. Rueda, 2007). Although this approach has its benefits, there 
has been some criticism of dichotomous insider-outsider divisions (e.g. Jessoula et al., 2010). As 
Schwander and Häusermann (2013, p. 251) have argued, in light of the fluidity of employment 
 
 
status in modern economies, this binary approach is most appropriate for investigations directly 
connected to employment status at a given moment. They therefore argue instead for a risk-based 
measure constructed on the basis of occupational categories, building on previous work by 
Kitschelt and Rehm (2005) and Oesch (2006). This approach is especially suited to the present 
investigation due to the centrality of risk, the fluidity of labour market status in modern 
economies, and the strong connection between atypical employment histories and benefit access 
for many welfare state programmes. The analysis thus utilises Schwander and Häusermann’s 
(2013) classificatory scheme to categorise outsiderness.  
These classifications are built using ISCO occupational codings. Workers are then further parsed 
within the various categories by country, gender, and age group (separating out those aged up to 
40 from those over 40, with this cut-off chosen because most European countries boast a 
considerable number of 30-somethings still in education (see Couppié and Mansuy, 2003)). 
Gender and age divisions are employed in light of the large body of literature that suggests they 
are strong predictors of labour market disadvantages (even holding skill levels constant ), with 
women and the young more likely to be labour market outsiders (e.g. Oesch, 2006; Kitschelt and 
Rehm, 2006; Emmenegger et al., 2012): for women, this vulnerability typically stems from 
childrearing and other care-giving obligations; while for the young, it is the result of their status 
as relatively new labour market entrants. The intuition here that is that gender and age are the 
key “sociostructural determinants” of atypical employment and unemployment (see Schwander 
and Häusermann, 2013, p. 253; Häusermann et al., 2016, p. 1051).  
Once the primary categorisation is complete, each individual is assigned a ‘degree of 
outsiderness’. 5 This is calculated – using micro-level data from the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) – as the difference that results from subtracting the 
mean workforce rate of unemployment and atypical employment from the group specific rate.6 
As a consequence, outsider status is determined not by a snapshot based on one’s employment 
contract, but rather by exposure to labour market risk. As Rovny and Rovny (2017) discuss in 
their comparison of various measures of labour market vulnerability, this is a key advantage of 
looking beyond specific individual-level characteristics (e.g. occupational group, contract-type, 
age, gender) and instead considering them in tandem: the process allows us to say something 
about one’s general experience of vulnerability. Insofar as we are concerned about outcomes – 
 
 
like generalised trust – that are potentially shaped by long-term experiences (rather than, for 
example, momentary contract type), this is a major benefit.  
This advantage does not come without costs, however: the measure is more complex to construct 
than going alternatives (in the process necessarily introducing some arbitrariness related to the 
choice of categorisation criteria); runs the risk of assigning to individuals a level of vulnerability 
that applies well to their subgroup but poorly to them; and could potentially lead researchers to 
confuse the effects of labour market risk with those of age and gender (Rovny and Rovny, 2017, 
p. 6).  
To address these risks, the analysis incorporates various sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness 
of the empirical investigation. The most central of these relate to alternative constructions of the 
outsiderness measures, whereby the subgroup categorisation components are altered. This 
involves several variants: (1) employing alternative age cut-offs (30 and 35 rather than 40); (2) 
incorporating a potentially curvilinear relationship between age and labour market risk, with both 
older (i.e. 55 and over) and younger (i.e. 35 and under) individuals potentially more vulnerable 
than the middle-aged; (3) removing the gender division from the variable, to ensure that we do 
not confuse the effects of vulnerability with those of gender; and (4) adding immigrant status, 
which itself may be a major marker of labour market vulnerability, to the subgroup 
categorisation scheme (using EU-SILC data on country of birth).7 While Schwander and 
Häusermann’s outsiderness scores are based on an older version of the EU-SILC (2007) dataset 
(v3), the values here are calculated using the most recent revision (v6) – though the results 
remain consistent even when using their original scores. As will be demonstrated in the section 
laying out the main analysis, the key results are robust to each of these changes. 
Table OA2 provides an overview of the (weighted) distribution of the baseline outsiderness 
variable, listing the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values for each of the 
cases and on average. The mean level of outsiderness ranges from about -0.5 Finland to 0.3 in 
Germany – with a negative (positive) mean indicating a sample of respondents, on average, less 
(more) exposed to unemployment and atypical employment. The overall mean is just under zero 
(at -.01). Continental and Southern European countries have the largest standard deviations, 
suggesting that there are large numbers of individuals who are either quite exposed to risk or 
 
 
quite insulated from it. The opposite is true in the Nordic countries, where mean outsiderness is 
consistently below zero and the standard deviations are the smallest.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1, in turn, graphs the weighted mean levels of trust both overall and for individuals that 
are above or below one standard deviation from the mean level of outsiderness in a given 
country. Here a dichotomous insider-outsider division is employed for ease of visualisation and 
to avoid ignoring the large cross-country differences in the spread of outsiderness. Countries are 
presented in descending order of generalised trust. The Southern European and Continental 
countries are in the bottom half of the distribution, while the Nordic states take the four highest 
placements. The UK and Ireland, in turn, lie in the middle. Differences in mean trust levels 
across countries are substantial, ranging from -.81 in Greece to .59 in Denmark (with a total 
range from -2.49 to 2.00). The difference is even starker when we compare Greek outsiders, at -
.92, with Norwegian insiders, at .59.  
More generally, the mean outsider, insider, and overall trust levels also follow the expected 
alignment, increasing as we move from outsiders to the overall average to insiders alone. The 
only exceptions are Austria, where the means essentially overlap, and Denmark, where insiders 
appear to be slightly less trusting than outsiders (though their trust level is still higher than any 
group in any other country, save for Norwegian insiders). Pooling data across the cases, the mean 
outsider and insider trust levels are statistically distinct, though this is not the case in several of 
the countries individually. Clearly, there are numerous other important influences at work. We 
therefore turn to the required controls before proceeding to the main analysis.  
The choice of controls is based upon the standards of pre-existing work examining generalised 
trust (e.g. Brewer et al., 2014). At the individual level, these include: education level (using the 
five-category harmonised ISCED-97 scheme); household income decile; household size, which 
may have an indirect effect (by changing the meaning of household income) or a direct one 
(insofar as individuals living alone may have lower trust); gender (with males coded as 1); age 
and its square, to incorporate a potentially curvilinear effect; trade-union membership; marital 
status; (self-described) status as a minority (minorities coded as 1); religion, included primarily 
to capture the Catholic/Protestant divide (with Catholics generally less trusting than Protestants); 
 
 
labour market status controls (unemployment, part-time employment, self-employment; non-
employment (i.e. those outside of the labour market)); and a dummy variable for survey wave.8  
Controls for factors closely related to labour market vulnerability – namely education, trade-
union membership, labour market status, and income – are particularly important here. Each of 
these variables is connected to labour market vulnerability conceptually, while at the same time 
being distinct from the employed measure of it: i.e., risk of unemployment and atypical 
employment. If the hypotheses above are correct, the long-term experience of labour market risk 
exposure should have an effect independent of not only other risk-related factors, but also 
momentary employment status.  
While education, trade-union membership, and labour market status are relatively 
straightforward to incorporate empirically into the models, income is somewhat more 
complicated. A sizeable proportion (22%) of respondents did not answer the question, and since 
non-response may itself be related to trust, its use may bias our results. To address this potential 
problem, we employed an alternative four-category ordinal question on feelings of income 
satisfaction (with only a 1% non-response rate) to confirm that the findings remain consistent 
regardless of specification. Since the key findings are unaffected and household income decile 
provides a more fine-grained control (given the present focus on risk), the analysis below 
employs only the direct income measure. 
At the national level, in turn, the key variable is ALMP expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
(with data from the OECD).9 The ALMP measure used includes spending on five key areas: 
direct job creation for the long-term unemployed or other “difficult to place” individuals; 
employment incentives designed to facilitate hiring (i.e. funding for recruitment, employment 
maintenance, and job rotation/sharing schemes); vocational rehabilitation and job subsidies for 
persons with reduced work capacities; start-up incentives offered to the unemployed or persons 
from other targeted groups, with the intention of encouraging them to create their own 
businesses; and training, whether via an apprenticeship or in an educational/training institution 
and/or a workplace. Overall, levels of ALMP spending across the countries vary considerably: 
expenditure ranges from 0.3 percent (in the UK) to 1.6 percent (in Denmark), with a mean of just 
over half a percent and a standard deviation of 2.7 (see Table OA3).  
 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Yet even countries with similar levels of ALMP outlay may vary considerably in the types of 
programmes they direct their funding towards. Figure 2 illustrates this variation using 
programme averages over the 2008-2014 period as a percentage of total ALMP expenditure.10 
Almost all countries (save for the Netherlands and Sweden) devote a substantial proportion (over 
20 percent) of their ALMP expenditure to training, and the vast majority also dedicate at least 10 
percent toward employment subsidies; by contrast, start-up incentives, direct job creation, and 
vocational rehabilitation/job subsidies are notably less popular, with many countries spending 
nothing whatsoever on the programmes. This cross-country variation necessarily introduces 
some slipperiness into discussions of the effects of overall ALMP expenditure, especially since 
even policies within a given programme type likely differ substantially across countries (see 
Bonoli, 2010). Given that the above theoretical expectations remain broadly applicable across the 
programme types, however, the analysis follows previous work (e.g. Anderson and Pontusson, 
2007; Lee, 2013) and focusses on the impact of ALMP expenditure as a whole.11 
In order to test Hypothesis 2, ALMP expenditure is then interacted with outsiderness in the main 
empirical analysis. While the measure of outsiderness assesses risk related to the structure and 
regulation of the labour market itself, its interaction with ALMP allows us to incorporate the 
effect of the social policy programmes most likely to influence labour market vulnerability. 
The analysis also follows previous work (especially Lee, 2013) in selecting national-level 
variables to control for context: inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient), with the 
expectation that greater inequality increases stratification and undermines social trust; changes in 
migrant stock (as a percentage of the population), with increases generally thought to weaken 
social trust by increasing heterogeneity in civil society; and the harmonised unemployment rate, 
which has the potential to affect not only risk but also ALMP expenditure.12 The overall number 
of country-level controls is restricted due to limitations related to both degrees of freedom and 
high collinearity. As a robustness check, however, measures of employment protection 
legislation, passive labour market policy expenditure, GDP per capita, and a Protestantism 
dummy, were substituted in to confirm no notable impact on the main results.13 Finally, with 
both the individual- and national-level variables, variance inflation factor indices confirm that 
 
 
multicollinearity poses no particular issues. Table OA3 provides descriptive statistics for all 
variables included in the main analysis. 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
The analysis proceeds in three stages, with all models built step-wise. The section begins with 
the simplest model, presenting results from the (generalised least squares) analysis with only 
individual-level variables and country fixed effects.14 It then explores mechanisms that might 
link outsiderness to trust, with major strands in the existing literature pointing toward the 
potential role of optimism, social exclusion, and recent job loss. Finally, it incorporates country-
level variables into the investigation, constructing a hierarchical model (using maximum 
likelihood estimation and incorporating weights) in which 77099 respondents are nested within 
54 country-year clusters, which are in turn nested within 16 country clusters. This three-level 
approach, coupled with the use of survey wave dummies, provides more accurate (i.e. 
conservative) results than alternative setups (see Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother, 2016). In 
running these models, only the intercepts are allowed to vary in the first set of models, with 
random slopes then added afterward. This final step provides a stricter test of our hypothesis, 
with the effect of outsiderness permitted to vary by country. Here the intuition is that various, 
unobserved country-level factors (e.g. culture) may lead the impact of outsiderness on trust to 
differ across countries.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 presents the results of the country fixed-effects model, with outsiderness as the key 
explanatory variable. Model 1 includes only outsiderness, while Model 2 adds education and the 
control for ESS wave. Models 3 and 4 add first the core standard and then additional common 
controls. This provides some assurance that the findings are not simply artefacts of a specific 
model construction. To confirm that the main effect does not rely entirely on our chosen measure 
of labour market vulnerability, an alternative model employs the standard binary outsider 
measure (separating out those with standard employment from those who are either unemployed 
or in atypical employment) in lieu of outsiderness (see Table OA4).  
 
 
Turning to the results presented in Table 1, outsiderness retains significance regardless of which 
set of controls is employed, supporting the claim that greater labour market vulnerability is 
associated with lower generalised trust. Results are not driven by any particular country or 
survey wave and are robust to changes in the variables and cases incorporated in the analysis. 
Controls take their expected signs, save for part-time employment status, which is correlated 
with higher rather than lower trust. This may be driven by the distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary part-time employment, which the ESS data do not capture.  
In the full model, an increase of one additional point of outsiderness is associated with a decrease 
in trust comparable to many of the standard control variables. Degrees of outsiderness range 
from -1.7 to 2.3, and the difference between the scores at the 25th and 75th percentile is 
approximately 1; thus, moving across the interquartile range is associated with a decrease in trust 
of just under 0.06. The shift from the 10th to the 90th percentile, in turn, is associated with a drop 
of about 0.11. To put these values in perspective, moving across the interquartile range of 
generalised trust scores involves a change of just over 1 point. While the effect is therefore 
relatively modest, it is nevertheless comparable to most of the key controls: unemployment and 
Protestantism, for example, are associated with impacts of about -0.11 and 0.09 respectively; 
similarly, movement from the 3rd to the 7th household income decile is associated with an 
increase in trust of 0.10.  
Indeed, only education appears to have a markedly greater impact. Completing tertiary education 
is associated with an increase in trust of 0.27 compared to an individual with less than lower 
secondary education, and an increase of 0.16 compared to someone with upper secondary 
education. Note, however, that large differences in outsiderness have the potential to offset a 
sizeable portion of this effect.  
What mechanisms might be behind this negative effect of outsiderness on trust? To address this 
question, the next set of models incorporate three additional variables into the analysis: 
optimism, social exclusion, and recent job loss. In light of existing research (e.g. Putnam, 2000; 
Uslaner, 2002), these three factors are prominent candidates for mechanisms linking outsiderness 
and generalised trust, and the ESS makes it possible to examine all of them. The measure of 
optimism, following previous work (e.g. Sønderskov and Dinesen, 2016), is based on a question 
about life satisfaction: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
 
 
nowadays?” Potential answers range from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely satisfied). 
Social exclusion, in turn, is measured using the question “how often do you meet socially with 
friends, relatives or work colleagues?”, with answers ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (every day). 
Finally, the effect of recent experiences of unemployment is examined using a question asking 
whether respondents have “been unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than three 
months” within the past five years. The fact that this variable captures unemployment 
experiences rather than current employment status is key, since bouts of job loss have been tied 
to both outsiderness and lower generalised trust (e.g. Laurence, 2005; Gash and McGinnity, 
2007).  
These three survey items allow us to examine whether there is any evidence that optimism, social 
exclusion, and job loss serve as mechanisms by asking: (1) whether outsiderness significantly 
affects optimism and socialising (job loss is excluded here since its connection to outsiderness is 
definitional, not psychological); (2) whether the three potential mechanisms significantly affect 
generalised trust in the absence of the outsiderness variable; and (3) whether outsiderness’s 
effect on trust is diminished after adding the potential mechanisms to the model. In each case the 
mediators are examined both together and separately.  
To begin, we should confirm that outsiderness does indeed seem to impact optimism and social 
exclusion, as suggested by previous research (e.g. Carroll, 2007; Anderson 2009). This is done 
via two additional sets of regressions, in which the standard dependent variable (generalised 
trust) is replaced by “life satisfaction” and “frequency of meeting socially” (while still 
controlling for all of the standard controls listed above, alongside self-assessed health). 
Regression results highlight a statistically significant effect of outsiderness on both life 
satisfaction (see Table OA5) and frequency of social meeting (see Table OA6). To test whether 
the effect is reliant on ALMP expenditure, the analysis is repeated on a divided sample, with 
below- and above-average ALMP expenditure (based on country-year observations) separated 
out (also in Tables OA5 and OA6). Doing so suggests, as expected, that the effect of 
outsiderness on both of these variables is either erased or weakened considerably in high-ALMP 
contexts. Having confirmed these effects, we must investigate whether life satisfaction, 
socialising, and recent job loss have independent impacts on trust. The findings provide evidence 
 
 
of an effect, regardless of whether the variables are included together or examined separately 
(see Table OA7).  
[Figure 3 about here] 
Finally, we must add these three variables to the full individual-level model that was laid out in 
Table 1 and compare the coefficients. The key results of this analysis are illustrated in Figure 3, 
which presents the regression coefficients of outsiderness across models with and without the 
mechanism variables (full regression results are listed in Table OA8). The panel includes the 
coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the standard full model (in black) and the standard 
full model with life satisfaction, frequency of meeting socially, and/or recent job loss (in grey) – 
all run on the same sample. The findings suggest that, in all instances, the mediator variables 
reduce the impact of outsiderness on trust; the most notable decreases, however, are limited to 
models that include life satisfaction. While these results are only suggestive, they point to the 
likelihood that the relationship between outsiderness and trust may well be driven by the 
mechanisms discussed above, with pessimism an especially likely candidate. 
On average, then, outsiderness does appear to affect generalised trust, and there is evidence to 
suggest that optimism in particular (as measured by life satisfaction) may be an important 
mechanism. But does the impact of outsiderness on trust vary across countries, with ALMP 
expenditure shaping the effect? The next set of regressions investigate this question: Models 1 
through 4 gradually introduce control variables into the core model (random-intercepts only). 
Models 5 and 6, in turn, allows the impact of outsiderness to vary across countries (i.e. adding 
random slopes), thereby controlling for unobserved factors and acting as a robustness check on 
the primary analysis. Key results are presented in figures below, with the full regression results 
reproduced in Table OA9.15 
The findings from the full (random-intercepts only) model, presented in Figure 4, suggest that 
the welfare state shapes the effect of outsiderness on trust. The figure overlays two graphs: a 
marginal effects plot (with 95% confidence intervals) of the impact of outsiderness on 
generalised trust across a range of values of ALMP expenditure; and the distribution of 
respondents across various levels of ALMP expenditure, illustrated via a dotted line. Extreme 
 
 
values of ALMP are excluded from the graphs, with marginal effects shown for the range of 
ALMP values that are between the 10th and 90th percentile.   
[Figure 4 about here] 
Looking at the marginal effects plot based on Model 4, one notes that the effect of outsiderness 
decreases as ALMP expenditure increases, eventually becoming statistically indistinguishable 
from zero at around 0.75% of GDP (around the 75th percentile of ALMP values). The interaction 
effect is significant (p < 0.001) and suggests that the pattern noted in Table 1 obscured variation 
in the extent to which outsiderness matters for trust. At the 10th percentile of ALMP values, for 
example, one notes a negative effect of about 0.08, but this effect drops to around 0.05 at the 
median (effects reflect movement across the interquartile range). In the former instance, moving 
from the 10th to the 90th percentile on outsiderness values would therefore be associated with 
trust scores about 0.14 points lower. Once again, while the size of the effect is not as large as the 
potential effect of education, it is comparable to or larger than all other controls.  
[Figure 5 about here] 
Figure 5 uses the primary analysis from Table OA9 to provide an alternative visualisation of the 
effect of outsiderness on trust at different levels of ALMP expenditure. Once again the x-axis 
spans the 10th to 90th percentile range of ALMP values, but here the graph presents the predictive 
margins at three values of outsiderness. This allows us to assess how changing levels of AMLP 
expenditure would affect the trust of an insider (at the 10th percentile), an outsider (at the 90th 
percentile) and someone in the middle (at the mean). Results highlight that the difference 
between insiders and outsiders (holding all other variables constant at their mean) narrows and 
eventually disappears as ALMP expenditure increases. 
Having established that ALMP expenditure appears to have a positive impact on outsiders’trust 
levels, one final question presents itself: given that some ALMP programmes likely 
disproportionately benefit lower educated outsiders relative to more highly educated ones, is the 
interactive effect stronger vis-à-vis the less educated? To test this, the above analysis was 
repeated with a three-way interaction between outsiderness, ALMP spending, and a binary 
education variable (split between those who completed any schooling beyond secondary school 
(38% of the sample) and those who did not (62% of the sample)). Figure 6 graphs the marginal 
 
 
effects of outsiderness on generalised trust across the 10th to 90th percentile range of ALMP 
expenditure, separating out the effects on low- (left panel) and high-educated individuals (right 
panel). (Regression tables are presented in Table OA10). Results suggest that the effect of 
outsiderness is present among both groups of outsiders – but, with the larger number of cross-
level interactions in this model, the interaction between outsiderness and ALMP no longer 
reaches statistical significance (p = .10). The three-way interaction itself, in turn, does not even 
near statistical significance. The results can thus at best only hint that education may play a role 
in mediating the relationship: the effect is modestly weaker for the higher educated (-.07 at the 
10th percentile of ALMP expenditure) than the lower educated (-.10); and, among the more 
highly educated, its impact becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero at a lower level of 
ALMP spending.   
[Figure 6 about here] 
Finally, a number of supplemental analyses were conducted to confirm the robustness of the 
direct effect of outsiderness and its interactive effect with ALMP expenditure. First, varying the 
included battery of individual-level and national-level controls returns similar patterns of results, 
as does excluding the cases for which we imputed outsiderness or ALMP data. Second, to 
confirm that the key findings are not driven by any particular case, the model was re-run 16 
times, dropping one country per iteration (i.e. remove-one jackknife). The resultant coefficients 
are equivalent to those in Model 3, and although the standard errors are slightly larger, both the 
direct effect of outsiderness and its interaction with ALMP expenditure remain statistically 
significant. Additional analyses confirm that the key effects also remain when the model is 
estimated allowing for random slopes (i.e. in Model 6 of OA9), using cluster robust standard 
errors, or looking only at individual survey waves. 
Lastly, the main analysis was re-conducted using five alternative variants of outsiderness to 
ensure that the results are robust to changes in the construction of the measure. This involved: (1) 
using 30 as the age cut-off, rather than 40 (see Table OA11); (2) using 35 as the age cut-off 
(Table OA12); (3) incorporating a curvilinear relationship between age and labour market risk, 
since both older (i.e. 55 and over) and younger (i.e. 35 and under) individuals proved generally 
more vulnerable than the middle-aged (Table OA13); (4) removing the gender division, to ensure 
we are not confusing the effects of vulnerability with those of gender (Table OA14); and (5) 
 
 
adding immigrant status alongside the other subgroup categorisations (Table OA15). Lastly, in 
line with the standard practice in the dualisation literature, the main analysis was repeated using 
the traditional (though, as we discussed above, problematic) binary measure of outsider status – 
i.e. based solely on current contract type (Table OA16). The findings suggest a robust 
relationship between labour market vulnerability and trust, as the key results are all substantively 
similar, despite limited variation in effect sizes. 
Overall, then, the study’s findings are consistent and in line with both Hypothesis 1 and 2: degree 
of outsiderness is reliably associated with a decreased level of generalised trust; and social policy 
programmes have the potential to mitigate the effect of that vulnerability on trust. While there is 
a general divide between trust levels among insiders versus outsiders, ALMP expenditure seems 
to shape the magnitude of outsiderness’s effect. 
 
Conclusion 
Combining insights from the literatures on dualisation and generalised trust, this article has 
sought to draw out the connections between social policy, labour market vulnerability, and trust. 
Research on dualisation highlights that labour market positions can have profound effects on 
both one’s exposure to labour market risk and one’s access to the welfare state. This suggests 
that institutional effects likely vary across insiders and outsiders – which provides an opportunity 
to investigate the mechanisms underlying the welfare state’s impact on trust.  
This article has argued that social policy programmes, by shaping the meaning and experience of 
labour market vulnerability, can have an important interactive effect with degree of outsiderness. 
Analyses based on ESS data from 16 Western European countries and the fine-grained, 
continuous measure of outsiderness developed by Schwander and Häusermann (2013) suggest a 
robust, negative relationship between outsiderness and generalised trust: dualisation does indeed 
appear to create a wedge between the trust levels of insiders and outsiders, with an effect size 
comparable to or larger than almost all other standard potential influences. What is more, the 
extent of this impact appears to be moderated by ALMP expenditure, with higher expenditure 
bringing the trust levels of insiders and outsiders closer together.  
 
 
Two contributions follow from this investigation. First, the analysis points to yet another 
potential consequence of dualisation, even when controlling for momentary employment status. 
Given that dualisation will likely continue, both in labour markets and welfare states, one should 
expect to find a growing divide in trust levels between insiders and outsiders. This has 
implications not only for the social capital of outsiders, but also for the numerous national-level 
consequences associated with trust, such as economic growth, democratic performance, and the 
long-term sustainability of the welfare state (see Nannestad, 2008, pp. 429-431). Although this 
appears to be a common issue cross-nationally, variation in the size of this effect suggests 
potential routes to mitigating these negative consequences.  
Second, by examining within-country variation in trust and focusing on the finding that an 
individual’s access to social programmes can reduce risk exposure and related negative 
consequences, this study avoids some of the standard pitfalls in the trust literature. In particular, 
this approach mitigates concerns related to cross-national cultural differences. The findings 
therefore support the argument that, at least in contemporary Western Europe, welfare states can 
influence trust, and they also point to a potential mechanism driving the effect. In addition, the 
results also suggest the importance of labour market institutions for trust, as they shape not only 
the distribution and extent of outsiderness in society, but (arguably) also the degree to which 
these outcomes are deemed to be fair.  
Some important caveats nevertheless remain. Most obviously, the findings do not suggest that 
we should cast aside other theorised mechanisms that might lead the welfare state to impact trust. 
The results also do not permit us to ascertain whether different sorts of ALMP expenditure have 
different effects on trust; nor can they answer historical questions about the original relationship 
between national trust levels and welfare state design. We can, however, point to evidence of a 
contemporary relationship that likely acts as a feedback mechanism, reinforcing the welfare state 
over time (see Rothstein, 2010).  
Finally, even allowing the impact of outsiderness to vary across countries only permits us to 
interrogate one aspect of the relationship between trust, outsiderness, and the welfare state. In 
particular, the possible influence of cultural factors on both the meaning and significance of 
outsiderness for trust-related consequences is obscured in the analysis. The example of Southern 
Europe highlights this issue, as there is evidence to suggest that familialism in the region may 
 
 
blunt not only the connection between outsiderness and precarity, but also its attitudinal impact 
(e.g. Bentolila and Ichino, 2001; Kevins, 2015; 2017).  
Much work clearly remains to be done. Perhaps most promisingly, the use of panel data would 
serve as a complementary approach to examining the impact of changes in outsiderness over 
time. Most importantly, such a study would also allow us to better disentangle the effects of 
outsiderness versus experiences of job loss and atypical employment – a relationship which 
remains muddled in the present study. Analysis of countries in additional regions is another 
obvious next step – but future research on the Continental and (especially) Southern European 
welfare states, where the insider-outsider divide has the most striking implications for benefit 
access, would also be valuable. Such work might extend the preceding investigation to examine 
the relationships between family-based access to benefits, particularistic (or even 
compartmentalised) trust, and social capital generally. Yet in the meantime, the relationship 
between outsiderness and generalised trust highlighted here suggests a further potential 
consequence of dualisation, and that, by shaping the significance of outsiderness, social policy 
does indeed appear to impact trust.  
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1 Note that although there is considerable debate as to the relative influence of socialisation versus experience on 
generalised trust – and hence the extent to which it is fixed or malleable (cf. Uslaner, 2008; Nannestad et al., 2014) 
– there are good reasons to believe that outsiderness should matter either way. In particular, one might expect 
that labour market vulnerability would affect trust through some combination of family socialisation (in situations 
of limited social mobility) and experiences upon entry to the labour market.  
2 In doing so, we unfortunately lose six occupational classifications (out of a total of 670). Given that they only 
amount to 0.3% of respondents in waves six and seven, however, the loss is minimal. 
3 Namely: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the UK. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 Note, however, that findings are robust to using only the question about trustworthiness as the dependent 
variable. 
5 For additional details, see Schwander and Häusermann (2013). 
6 Since the latest EU-SILC revision lacks the required data on Switzerland, the scores are constructed using the 
Continental regime averages for each labour market subcategory. While the added scores are not precisely 
tailored to the Swiss labour market, this approach provides additional statistical leverage, and I ensure that the 
findings in each model are not driven by Switzerland.  
7 I thank the authors for generously providing access to their code.  
8 I also tested alternative models excluding employment status (due to post-treatment bias) and including other 
potentially relevant controls or alternatives (i.e. retired status, self-placement on the left-right scale, and 
frequency of church attendance). The key findings remained in all instances. 
9 The models employ the OECD’s ALMP expenditure measure that includes indicators 20-70. It was selected over 
the alternative measure that also incorporates indicator 10 (thereby adding expenditure on the costs of benefit 
administration and placement services) partly due to missing data – most notably, the complete absence of Greek 
data. Nevertheless, the key findings remain when indicator 10 is included. Furthermore, since ALMP data has not 
yet been released for 2014, 2013 data for ESS round 7 is substituted instead. Findings are consistent without round 
7, however. 
10 Figure 2 is illustrated using the plotplain scheme (Bischof forthcoming). 
11 An alternative approach would be to include each of the ALMP sub-components separately within the models, 
interacting them individually with outsiderness. Unfortunately, however, we lack the requisite degrees of freedom 
to undertake such an analysis within this study.  
12 ALMP and unemployment data are from the OECD’s National Accounts Statistics, Labour, and Social Protection 
and Well-being datasets. Inequality data is from Eurostat, while migrant stock data are interpolated from the UN’s 
Trends in International Migrant Stock. 
13 All data are from the OECD (aside from the Protestantism dummy). 
14 Note that weights cannot be included in this model, but an alternative model (using country dummies) confirms 
that weighting does not alter the findings.  
15 The interaction between outsiderness and ALMP expenditure is central, so the key regression results should be 
read carefully: specifically, the coefficients for outsiderness and ALMP expenditure on their own point to the effect 
where the other variable is set to zero, while the interaction coefficient indicates the result of changing either 
variable by one unit while holding the other constant. 
